What nickname does Manstein (nearly said Rammsteinoceanhawk wrote:
okay, but while you are at it, find me one historical source that shows Rommel to be better...
)or whatever have?Dear players,
here is a small poll for you. Which of these two generals do you know or even like better?
George S. Patton, US Army general
or
Bernard Montgomery, Field Marshal of the British Army
We would love to hear your opinions and see some discussions here!
Your Call of War Team
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What nickname does Manstein (nearly said Rammsteinoceanhawk wrote:
okay, but while you are at it, find me one historical source that shows Rommel to be better...
)or whatever have?I beleive it is "General Nazi", as far as I recallQuasi-duck wrote:
What nickname does Manstein (nearly said Rammsteinoceanhawk wrote:
okay, but while you are at it, find me one historical source that shows Rommel to be better...)or whatever have?

A far cry from Desert Fox, eh?oceanhawk wrote:
I beleive it is "General Nazi", as far as I recall
Dont get ya?Quasi-duck wrote:
A far cry from Desert Fox, eh?oceanhawk wrote:
I beleive it is "General Nazi", as far as I recall
He was a better general than Rommel was, but Rommel may have been a better heroic figure.. Manstein was critical of Hitlers Decisions as well, just like Rundhsted and Rommel...
But Manstein far outweighs Rommel as a military Commander

Whatever. Was it Manstein that pushed to try and keep the Pz. IV's and III's, juts up-gun them?
Of German generals I prefer the Fuhrer's "fireman" Walter Model.
From Wikipedia. full article here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Model
"He is noted for his defensive battles in the latter half of the war, mostly on the Eastern Front but also in thewest. He has been called the Third Reich's best defensive tactical commander."
"Although he was a hard-driving, aggressive panzer commander early in the war, Model became best known as a practitioner of defensive warfare. His success at the head of the Ninth Army in the defensive battles of 1941β42 determined his future career path."
"Model, now reinforced with additional troops, reorganised his command into three groups: an infantry-heavy force that would cross the river and establish a bridgehead, a mobile armoured group that would pass through the bridgehead and continue the advance, and a fire support group containing nearly all his artillery. The plan worked so successfully that the river crossing cost scarcely any casualties."
"When Model took over, his sector was in a shambles: the Kalinin Front had broken through the line and was threatening the Moscow-Smolensk railway, the main supply route for Army Group Centre. Despite the danger, he realised the precarious position the attackers themselves were in and immediately counterattacked, cutting off the Soviet 39th Army. In the ferocious battles that followed, he repelled multiple Soviet attempts to relieve their trapped soldiers, the last being in February. He then squeezed out the pocket at his leisure, in a series of operations culminating in mid-July"
"Having restored Ninth Army's front, Model set about holding it. His defensive doctrine, which combined conventional thinking with his own tactical innovations, was based on the following principles: Up-to-date intelligence, based on front-line sources and reconnaissance instead of relying on reports from rear-area analysts. A continuous front line, no matter how thinly held. Tactical reserves to halt any imminent breakthrough. Centralised artillery command and control. Since the end of World War I, German divisions had had their artillery spread out amongst their component regiments, which made it difficult to bring the maximum weight of fire to bear on any one point. Model reorganised his artillery into special battalions under the direct control of the divisional and corps-commanders. Multiple static lines of defence, to delay the enemy's advance. Hitler had in fact forbidden the construction of multiple lines, saying that soldiers would be tempted to abandon their current line in favour of falling back to the next; Model ignored this order."
The list could go on but that would be too much reading, I think he did remarkably well...until the Ruhr offensive.
He sounds so good I'll delete my previous comment.
What you trying to say?Quasi-duck wrote:
Whatever. Was it Manstein that pushed to try and keep the Pz. IV's and III's, juts up-gun them?

Was Manstein in favour of new tanks, or up-gunning the current ones before the Tiger's and Panther's were built?oceanhawk wrote:
What you trying to say?
Nah. Rommel was a genius.oceanhawk wrote:
But Manstein far outweighs Rommel as a military Commander
Yes, he did, but this is taken out of context. He had nothing against heavy tanks, but in a specific case he was extremely unhappy to have to wait several months, giving the enemy plenty of time to prepare its defenses, to receive a handful of Panzer Vs(instead of attacking directly), as Hitler insisted. And on that specific case, he was completely right - the Battle of Kursk was a disaster for the Germans, since the Soviets under Zhuckov had multiple months to prepare one of the deepest defences in depth(up to 200km, if I am correct), and for the whole Steppe Front(again,numbers I forget, a ~400,000 army, brought from the Far East, and Zhukov's last stategic reserve) to arrive. Both of these prevented Manstein from achieving victory(just as he was starting to overcome the biggest portion of the defenses the Steppe Front hit him, and hit him hard; and besides, the operation was supposed to be a two-prolonged assault to encircle the Kursk bulge, and only the Southern attack, Manstein's, succeeded, the Northern part was stopped much earlier) and he was furious - if only the hadn't waited months to strike...Quasi-duck wrote:
Was Manstein in favour of new tanks, or up-gunning the current ones before the Tiger's and Panther's were built?oceanhawk wrote:
What you trying to say?
Either, the German heavy tanks were absolute tanks ( haha see what I did there
) of engineering and as a consequence they were a heavy burden to maintain and supply. (If I am not mistaken) even Guderian was against throwing huge ressources into small amounts of heavy tanks that were costly to use

Not saying he wasnt, but Manstein was better...Pablo22510 wrote:
Nah. Rommel was a genius.oceanhawk wrote:
But Manstein far outweighs Rommel as a military Commander
2 of them would have been unstoppable.. if they were running the entire war

Manstein was very good, but Rommel fought trough adverse consequences to victory.oceanhawk wrote:
Not saying he wasnt, but Manstein was better...2 of them would have been unstoppable.. if they were running the entire war
Oh, okay. Thanks.oceanhawk wrote:
Yes, he did, but this is taken out of context. He had nothing against heavy tanks, but in a specific case he was extremely unhappy to have to wait several months, giving the enemy plenty of time to prepare its defenses, to receive a handful of Panzer Vs(instead of attacking directly), as Hitler insisted. And on that specific case, he was completely right - the Battle of Kursk was a disaster for the Germans, since the Soviets under Zhuckov had multiple months to prepare one of the deepest defences in depth(up to 200km, if I am correct), and for the whole Steppe Front(again,numbers I forget, a ~400,000 army, brought from the Far East, and Zhukov's last stategic reserve) to arrive. Both of these prevented Manstein from achieving victory(just as he was starting to overcome the biggest portion of the defenses the Steppe Front hit him, and hit him hard; and besides, the operation was supposed to be a two-prolonged assault to encircle the Kursk bulge, and only the Southern attack, Manstein's, succeeded, the Northern part was stopped much earlier) and he was furious - if only the hadn't waited months to strike...Either, the German heavy tanks were absolute tanks ( haha see what I did there ) of engineering and as a consequence they were a heavy burden to maintain and supply. (If I am not mistaken) even Guderian was against throwing huge ressources into small amounts of heavy tanks that were costly to use
Rommel was very good, but Manstein fought through adverse consequences to victory.Pablo22510 wrote:
Manstein was very good, but Rommel fought trough adverse consequences to victory.oceanhawk wrote:
Not saying he wasnt, but Manstein was better...2 of them would have been unstoppable.. if they were running the entire war
Manstein's plans for the defense of normandy were of better quality, especially with the limited resources that Germans had in that region.. and also cos of them wasting res on U-boat shelters..
Rommel would have defended Normandy better, by following Manstein's plans..

Err, you know Rommel's plan was exactly the same as Manstein's, just that Hitler didn't let him do it?oceanhawk wrote:
Rommel would have defended Normandy better, by following Manstein's plans..
Not really, Rommel wanted the wall,Pablo22510 wrote:
Err, you know Rommel's plan was exactly the same as Manstein's, just that Hitler didn't let him do it?oceanhawk wrote:
Rommel would have defended Normandy better, by following Manstein's plans..
Give me one good argument why Rommel is better... and some examples in combat..

Rommel obviously wanted the wall. Makes it harder to disembark, doesn't it?oceanhawk wrote:
Not really, Rommel wanted the wall,Give me one good argument why Rommel is better... and some examples in combat..
Look, I'll give you an example. When the Allies disembarked, Rommel wanted to fall back to the Seine-Rhone line, fortify himself there, where his inferiority in numbers wouldn't matter, and then launch a quick counterattack with two Panzer divisions and send the Allies back to the beaches.
Well, the wall didnt work, did it?Pablo22510 wrote:
Rommel obviously wanted the wall. Makes it harder to disembark, doesn't it?oceanhawk wrote:
Not really, Rommel wanted the wall,Give me one good argument why Rommel is better... and some examples in combat..
Look, I'll give you an example. When the Allies disembarked, Rommel wanted to fall back to the Seine-Rhone line, fortify himself there, where his inferiority in numbers wouldn't matter, and then launch a quick counterattack with two Panzer divisions and send the Allies back to the beaches.
K time to debunk this once and for all
Rommelβs was an overwhelmingly minority viewpoint. His superior, Rundstedt, supported a completely different approach to the defense of northwestern France. The Werhrmachtβs senior active-duty field marshal found his position strongly supported by the commander of German armored forces in the West, General Schweppenburg. The Rundstedt-Geyr von Schweppenburg operational solution basically said that there was nothing they could do to prevent a successful Allied landing. Instead, they championed tactics much in consonance with German operational and tactical doctrine, as expressed in Die Truppenfuhrung (Troop Leadership, cant speak German very well, so spelling may be a bit off), the Wehrmachtβs basic doctrinal manual. The two generals argued that German forces in the West should concentrate available armored forces for a massive counterattack against the Allies once they were ashore. , the panzer forces should be held back from the coast; then once the Allies had landed, the panzers would concentrate and move forward to counterattack. German armor would also then be available to execute a mobile defense that would utilize superior Wehrmacht training, tactics and equipment. Manstien was behind Rundstedt's idea, and helped to plan it.
As for the Atlantic Wall, it was a complete failure and an Huuugggeee waste of time and resources. The Germans had, with stunning effect, shown the advantages of mobile warfare. To revert back to static defense, which harkens back to the type of trench warfare used in WWI, proved the dire straits that Germany was really in. It had already lost air superiority and had never really gained mastery of the seas. This, combined with the vast amount of men and materials chewed up in the East, made it's loss in Normandy an all but forgone conclusion....

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